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accidental bequest. Even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities, there will be some
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Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests
By ANDREW B. ABEL*
This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and
accidental bequests. This model is used to
analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption
and capital accumulation. A precautionary
demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the
date at which he will die, and he wants to
avoid low levels of consumption in the event
that he lives longer than expected. An implication of this precautionary saving is that
when death does occur, the consumer is generally holding some wealth, which is then
passed on to his heirs in the form of an
accidental bequest. Even if all consumers
have the same ex ante mortality probabilities, there will be some intracohort variation
in the date of death; consequently there will
be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests
left by consumers in a cohort. This nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one
generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth, consumption, and bequests
of subsequent generations.
The importance of bequests in aggregate
saving has been established by Laurence
Kotlikoff and Lawrence Summers (1981) who
reported that 80 percent of U.S. household
wealth is inherited wealth. One interpreta-

tion of this finding is that the simple life

cycle model without bequest motives is an
inadequate description of saving behavior in

the United States, but the model I present
demonstrates that accidental bequests by
selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth.
Although some part of bequests, especially
by the wealthy, undoubtedly results from an
explicit bequest motive, accidental bequests
also play a role in the intergenerational
transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth. In order to
focus on the role of accidental bequests, I
purposely exclude a bequest motive from the

specification of the utility function.'
The effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first ex-

amined formally in a seminal paper by
Menachem Yaari (1965). Yaari's model provided the basic framework for virtually all
subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well-known papers by Nils Hakansson (1969), Stanley Fischer (1973), Robert
Barro and James Friedman (1977), David
Levhari and Leonard Mirman (1977), and
Kotlikoff and Avia Spivak (1981). However,
all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored
the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental
*Department of Economics, Harvard University, bequests.2 As will be shown at various points
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the endogenous adjustment of bequests are

modeled by embedding consumers with uncertain lifetimes into an overlapping-generations model a la Franco Modigliani and
Richard Brumberg (1979), Paul Samuelson
(1958), and Peter Diamond (1965). The model
is dramatically different from the overlapping generations model with uncertain life-

times proposed by Eytan Sheshinski and
Yoram Weiss (1981), because SheshinskiWeiss assume that all consumers who are
born at the same date also die on the same

date. Thus, unlike the model presented below, the Sheshinski-Weiss model does not
generate intracohort variation in bequests,
consumption, and wealth.
Zvi Eckstein, Martin Eichenbaum, and
Dan Peled (1985a) have developed an overlapping generations model in which consumers have identical ex ante mortality
probabilities but die at different ages. Since
the Eckstein et al. model, which was developed independently of my model presented
below, is similar to that model, it is worth
commenting on the differences between the
two models. First, and most importantly, the
Eckstein et al. model has no capital although
one could interpret that model as applying to
an economy in which the net rate of return
on capital is zero (i.e., a costless storage
technology). However, as shown below, the
effects of Social Security policy differ depending on whether or not the rate of return
on capital is zero. Second, in my model, the
instantaneous utility function is assumed to
display hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA), whereas Eckstein et al. use a more
general concave utility function. However,
their formulation is not as general as it might
first appear because Eckstein et al. must at
some point assume that the concavity of the
derived saving function is "not too large"
without presenting the implied restrictions
on the utility function. An advantage of the
HARA utility function used here is that it
leads to linear decision rules, thereby making
the analysis easily tractable. Third, my model presented below allows for nonzero rates
of time preference and population growth,
whereas each of these rates is assumed to be
zero by Eckstein et al.
In Section I, I present a simple model of
individual consumption behavior in the pres-

ence of an uncertain lifetime. In Section II,
I trace the effects of accidental bequests on
the saving and consumption of subsequent
generations and calculate the steady-state
intracohort distributions of consumption,
wealth, and bequests. The next three sections
analyze the aggregate and distributional consequences of introducing different types of
annuities into the economy. Section III demonstrates that, in the absence of an annuity
market, the introduction of a fully funded
actuarially fair Social Security system leads
to a reduction in the steady-state national
capital stock. In addition, the introduction of
actuarially fair Social Security reduces all
central moments of the distributions of consumption, wealth, and bequests. Section IV
is devoted to an analysis of the transition
path to the new steady state. In Section V, I
show that the introduction of a competitive
annuity market can cause the steady-state
capital stock either to rise or fall depending
on whether the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is less than or greater than a certain
critical value. Concluding remarks and directions for further research are presented in
Section VI.
I. Individual Consumption Behavior
under Uncertain Lifetime

Consider an economy with many consumers and a single commodity. This commodity can be either consumed or invested.
If one unit of the commodity is invested, it
yields R units of the commodity in the following period. Each consumer lives either
one or two periods. A consumer works during the first period of his (or her) life earning
a fixed labor income Y.3 Also in the first
period of his life, a consumer consumes an

amount cl and pays a tax T. At the end of

the first period of his life, the consumer has
G ?1 children. There is a probability p that
the consumer dies at the end of his first

3It is assumed that the production function is linear

in capital and employment. Let N, be the number of
consumers born at the beginning of period t and let

K,-1 be the average capital stock held at the end of
period t-1 by consumers born at the beginning of

period t -1. Then aggregate output in period t is N, Y +

RN, -IK,-1.
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period of life4 (after having the children). If
the consumer survives to the second period
of life, he does not work but receives a Social
Security payment S. He then consumes an
amount c2. When a consumer dies (either at
the end of period one or period two), any
unconsumed wealth is divided equally among
his children.
Each consumer chooses c1 and c2 to maximize the following utility function

(1) U(CO + (1-P) U(CA

when he is born.7 For the moment, take B as
given; the determination of B will be discussed in Section II.

Finally, W is defined to be the wealth held
by a consumer at the end of the first period
of his life:

(2) W= B + Y-T-cl.
If a consumer dies at the end of his first
period of life, each of his children receives
R W/G as a bequest at the beginning of the
following period. If the consumer survives

where 0 < 8 < 1. This utility function is based

into the second period, he consumes C2=

on the uncertain lifetime literature in which
the discounted utility index for period j is
multiplied by the probability of being alive
in period j. This formulation is simply the
expected value of a state-contingent utility

R W + S, because he derives no utility from
leaving a bequest. Using equation (2), we
have

contingent on being alive at age j, and the
utility index is identically zero contingent on
not being alive at age j.5 According to the
utility function in (1), consumers do not care
about their children; they derive no utility
from leaving bequests.6

The consumer's first-period consumption
is determined by maximizing (1) with respect

(3) C2 =R [ B + Y-T-cl ] + S.
function in which U(cj) is the utility index

Up to this point it may appear that all
consumers are identical: they have identical
utility functions, labor income Y, taxes T,
childbearing characteristics, probabilities of
survival, and, if they survive, identical Social
Security benefits S. However, different consumers receive bequests of different sizes depending on the mortality history of the earlier
generations of their families. Let B be the
bequest a consumer receives from his parent
4Although individual consumers face uncertainty

about their date of death, there is no aggregate uncertainty; a fraction p of consumers in each generation
dies at the end of the first period of life.

to cl, subject to the constraint in (3), to
obtain

(4) U'(cl) = (1-p) RSU'(C2)The first-order condition in (4) equates the
marginal utility of a unit of first-period consumption with the expected present value of
the utility from the R units of second-period
consumption which could be obtained by
reducing current consumption by one unit. I
specify the utility index U(c) to be a member
of the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) family8

(5) U(c) - uy t-h y o l
With HARA utility, the optimal value of

51t is not necessary that the utility index is equal to
zero in the case of death. All that is required is that

utility in the state of death does not depend on the level
of wealth.
6 Fischer and Sheshinski-Weiss model consumers as

7If a parent dies after the first period of his life, his

child receives a bequest B at the beginning of the first
period of the child's life. If a parent lives two periods,

deriving utility from leaving a bequest. This utility is a

then as shown below, the child receives no bequest in

function of the size of the bequest. Barro (1974) and
Allan Drazen (1978), in models without lifetime uncertainty, assume that consumers derive utility from the

either period; in this case, of course, the bequest re-

utility of their children. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei
Shleifer, and Summers (1984) argue that parents use the
prospect of bequests as a way to induce their children to
behave in ways that the parent wants. Thus, although
parents care only about their own utility, they find it
optimal to leave bequests.

ceived at birth by the child is zero.
The utility function in (5) is subject to the following

restrictions: y 1; B > O; (,Bc/(1- y))+ ij > 0; i = 1 if
-y = - oc. The HA RA family of utility functions includes
the following special cases: (i) constant relative risk
aversion (,j = 0), which includes logarithmic utility if
y = 0; (ii) constant absolute risk aversion (-y = + oc);
and (iii) quadratic utility (y = 2).
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first-period consumption can be written as a

of the consumer. Combining equations (2)

linear function of the present value of life-

and (6) yields

time income B + Y-T + R -s,
(7) W= (1-a)(B+Y-T)-aR-'S-b.

(6a) cl=a(B+Y-T+R-'S)+b,
Combining equations (3) and (6) yields the

where

income expansion path

(6b) 0<a

(8) C2= [(1-a)cl-b] R/a,

= [I1+ R-'[(I -p) RS]
</(
I)and<positively sloped.
which
is linear
(6c) b = ((I1--y) rql,8) aR-

II. Intergenerational Transfers

I have
solved
x |1-((1-p )R8 )11(1
7Y)]
Note that a, the marginal propensity to con-

sume, is a positive constant less than one.
If U(c) has constant relative risk aversion

the consumer's saving-consumption decision conditional on the bequest B received at birth. In this section, I
calculate the bequests received by each consumer. The bequest received by a consumer

depends on the mortality history of the earlier
generations of his family. Specifically, let j
of disposable lifetime resources B + Y - T +
be the number of consecutive previous generR - 'S. Let a 1- -y be the (constant) coeffiations in a consumer's family that died at
cient of relative risk aversion and note that if
age 1 (i.e., did not live to the second period
R = 8 = 1 (i.e., zero time preference and zero
of their life). For example, j = 0 indicates
net rate of return on capital), then the fracthat the consumer's parent lived two periods
and therefore left no bequest to the contion of total disposable resources (B + Y - T
sumer. If j =1, then the consumer's parent
+ S) consumed in the first period of life is
died at age I leaving a bequest but the
a = [1 + (1 - p)/I]-l. The greater the coefficonsumer's grandparent lived two periods
cient of relative risk aversion, the smaller the
leaving no bequest. All consumers are infraction of disposable resources consumed in

= 0), then b = 0 and first-period con-

sumption is proportional to the present value

the first period. In the limit as a -x o, a
consumer would consume one-half of dis-

posable resources in the first period; with a
large a, the desire to smooth consumption is
so strong that the consumer is willing to save
one-half of his resources in order to provide
for second-period consumption equal to
first-period consumption even though he
might die before the second period. On the
other hand, in the limit as a -- 0, the desire
to smooth consumption is very weak so the
consumer would consume all of his disposable resources in the first period.9
Using the consumption function (6), we
can easily calculate the end-of-first-period
wealth and the second-period consumption

dexed according to j and I use the superscript j written in parentheses to indicate
that a variable pertains to a consumer of
type j. Observe that p'(l - p) is the fraction
of consumers who are of type j.
First consider type-0 consumers. As indicated above, the parents of these consumers
lived two periods, leaving no bequest so that

B(-)= 0. The first-period consumption and
end-of-first-period wealth of these consumers
follow immediately from (6) and (7), respectively: 10

(9) c?) = a(Y -T+ R-1S)+ b,
(9 __)As/_\ 1_

9If the consumer cannot borrow against his (uncer10I assume that S and T are small enough and that
tain) future Social Security benefit S, then cl - B + the
Y - utility function and labor income are such that

indeed consume all of his disposable lifetime resources

W(?) > 0. Note that if b = 0 (as it would be with constant relative risk aversion), then W(?) > 0 provided that

in the first period.

S and T are small enough.

T as a - 0. Of course, if S = 0, then the consumer will
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Now consider consumers who receive posi-

I have now obtained a complete formal

tive bequests at birth, that is, consumers of
type j, j ?1. Because all consumers have the

solution of the model. Given any nonnega-

same constant marginal propensity to consume, the difference in first-period consumption between any two consumers is propor-

tive integer j, we know that a fraction (1p)pJ of the population is of type j. Then,
using equations (9)-(11), (13), and (14), it is
a simple matter to calculate the consump-

tional to the difference in the bequests they

tion, wealth, and bequests received at birth

received at birth. In particular, the first-

exceeds the first-period consumption of a

by each type-j consumer. The next step is to
summarize the distributions of consumption,
wealth and bequests by calculating the values

type-0 consumer by aBO'):

of aggregate first-period consumption C1*,

(11) CO) = aB(i) + c(?)

aggregate private wealth W*, and aggregate

Similarly, intracohort differences in end-offirst-period wealth are proportional to intracohort differences in the bequest received
at birth, so that from (7) and (10) we obtain

expressed on a per capita basis (more precisely, per person in the young generation).'2
Calculating the aggregate per capita values

period consumption of a type-j consumer

aggregate second-period consumption C2*,

bequests B*. Each of these aggregates is

(12) W(j) = (I1-a) BOj + W(?).
Having related first-period consumption

of both sides of (12), we obtain

(15) W* = (1-a)B* + W(O).
Because a fraction p of each type of con-

sumer dies early leaving a bequest, aggregate
and end-of-first-period wealth to BO), the
bequest received at birth, the next step is to

wealth held by consumers who die young is

pW*. Including the accrued interest on this
calculate B 0). If a type-j -1 consumer dies

after one period, he leaves a bequest of

G-'W(j-') to each of his children (who are
type-j consumers). The bequest earns a gross

wealth and adjusting for the fact that each
generation has G times as many consumers
as the previous generation, we obtain

rate of return R so that

(13) B(i)= (R/G)W('-1) =1,2,3....

(16) B* = p(R/G)W*.
Substituting (16) into (15) yields

Substituting (13) into (12) yields the first-

order linear constant coefficient difference

(17) W*=W(O)/(1-(1-a)pR/G).

equation W(i) = (1 - a)(R/G)WO-') +

W( =1, 2,3,..., which has the solution

(14) W(-) = W() (1-a)'(R /G)'

Therefore, per capita wealth is proportional
to W(0), the wealth of type-O consumers, and
the constant of proportionality is independent of the tax parameters T and S.

i=O

j = 0,1,2,....
According to (14), as we increase the
number of previous generations that died

early leaving bequests, we increase W( j).
We will assume that (1- a)R < G; hence,

as j increases, WO') approaches W(?)/

[1 -(1- a)(R/G)] asymptotically."1

[(1 - p)8]l/(l Therefore, (1- a)R < G if and only

if OR"'1'- Y)[1-G/R] < G. If R > G, then the con-

vergence condition holds if and only if p < [G/

(R -G)]R -/(1 - e)

12For example, aggregate private wealth per capita is

defined as W* = Y3?o(1 p)p' W('). Since only a fraction (1- p) of young consumers survives to the second

period of life, and since each generation is only G-'
times as large as the succeeding generation, aggregate
second-period consumption is

1'Since 0 < a < 1, it follows immediately that if R <
G, then the convergence condition (1 - a) R < G holds.
To examine the case where R > G, observe from (6b)

that (1- a) R =,fRll(l-Y)/[l + fRYl(l-Y)], where -=

C2 - (1- p)G- 1 (1- p)pk Ci.
I 0)
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Aggregate economywide private consump-

Security benefit is (1 - p) R - 'S which is equal

tion per capita, C{* + C2*, is equal to the sumto the consumer's contribution. Put differof after-tax labor income, Y - T, plus Social
Security payments to the surviving fraction
(1 - p) of the old cohort, plus the net return

on wealth, adjusted for population growth,'3
(18) C1*+C2*=Y-T+(1-p)G-'S

+ ( RI G-1) W*

ently, the Social Security system runs a balanced account vis-'a-vis each generation. The
Social Security system collects taxes from the
members of each generation when they are
young, invests the tax revenue at a gross rate
of return R, and then returns all of the tax
revenue with accrued interest to the surviv.ing old members of the generation.

Aggregate
Consumption and
A final useful relation between A.
C*
and C2*
is obtained by calculating the per capita values of both sides of the income expansion
path in (8) and recalling that the old cohort

Capital Accumulation

has (1 - p)G ' times as many consumers as

In order to study the effects of actuarially
fair Social Security on aggregate consump-

the young cohort,

tion, I proceed in three steps. First, I analyze

(19) C2*=(1-p)G -[(1-a)C,*-b] R/a.

and consumption behavior of type-0 con-

the effects of Social Security on the saving

sumers. Then, I use the results about the

Thus, C1* and C2* move in the same direc- effects on W(?) to analyze the effects on the
tion in response to changes in labor income
Y, or in the Social Security parameters S
and T.
III. The Effects of Actuarially Fair
Social Security

In this section I consider the effects on
savings and consumption of the introduction
of a fully funded actuarially fair Social
Security system. Let us suppose that the only
role of the government is to collect Social
Security taxes from the young and distribute
Social Security benefits to the old. Thus the
taxes T levied on the young are Social Security taxes. An actuarially fair Social Security
system would levy a tax of (1 - p) R - l dollars for each dollar of expected benefits, that
is, RT=(1-p)S. Under this system, a

young consumer contributes (1-p )R - 'S to
the Social Security system. He receives S if
he survives to the second period of life, but
receives zero if he dies after one period. Thus

the expected present value of the Social

'3Observe from (2) and (16) that C * = B* + Y- T-

W* =Y-T-(1-pR/G)W*. Since c(i)= RW(j)+S,
and since the old cohort is (1 - p)CG- times as large as

private capital stock and on the total national capital stock. Finally, the relations
between the national capital stock and aggregate consumption are used to determine

the effects on Cl* and C2*.

To calculate the effects of actuarially fair
social security on consumption and saving of
young type-0 consumers, we substitute T=

(1- p)R 'S into (9) and (10) to obtain
(20) c(?)= aY+b+apR-'S,

(21) W(0)=(1-a)Y-b-T-apR-'S.
The introduction of actuarially fair Social
Security increases the present value of life-

time resources, B + Y-T + R -1S, by -T +
R l'S = pR - 'S. A consumer who survives to
the second period receives a Social Security
payment S that exceeds the value of his
contribution with accrued interest, RT, because the surviving members of each generation receive (on a pro rata basis) the taxescum-interest contributed by members of their
generation who died after one period. The
effect of this increase in lifetime resources is
to increase c(?) by apR - 1S.14 The wealth

the young cohort, we obtain C2* = (1 - p) G - l ( R W* +
14An alternative explanation for the increase in conS). Adding together the expressions for C1* and C2*
yields (18).

sumption is that a consumer's claim to Social Security
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held at the end of the first period by type-O

first-period wealth in (2) that

consumers is reduced for two reasons: first,
disposable resources available in the first
period fall by the amount of the tax T;

(22) W* + T = Y+ B*-C1*I.

second, the increase in first-period consump-

Then calculating the aggregate per capita

tion further reduces wealth held at the end of

values of both sides of (11) we obtain

the first period."5
In a fully funded Social Security system,
the total national capital stock per capita
(measured at the end of a period) is equal to

the sum of the aggregate private capital stock
per capita, W*, and the per capita capital
stock held by the Social Security system T.
Recall from (17), that the private capital

(23) C* = aB* + c(O)
Substituting (23) into (22) yields

(24) W*+T=Y+(1-a)B*-c(o).

stock W* is proportional to W", andSince
thatthe
the constant of proportionality does not depend on the parameters of the Social Security system. Since, from (21), the introduction

of Social Security reduces W(?), it also reduces the aggregate private capital stock.

Since B* = ( pR/G)W*, the reduction in the
aggregate private capital stock implies an
equiproportionate reduction in aggregate be-

introduction of Social Security
causes B* to fall and c(?) to increase, it is

clear from (24) that the aggregate national
capital stock W* + T is reduced by the introduction of Social Security.
Next I examine the effects on aggregate
consumption of the introduction of actuarially fair Social Security. Substituting RT
for (1 - p)S in (18) gives

quests per capita.

The effect of actuarially fair Social Security on the aggregate national capital stock

per capita, W* + T, is easily determined by
first observing from the definition of end-of-

benefits can be viewed as an annuity. If the consumer
survives until retirement, the annuity pays some specified
amount, but if the consumer dies before retirement, the
annuity pays zero. Under an actuarially fair Social
Security system, the price that the consumer pays for
this annuity (i.e., the Social Security tax levied on young
consumers) is equal to the expected present value of
future payoffs. However, consumers would be willing to
pay more than the expected present value of future
payoffs because the payoffs are positively correlated
with future marginal utility of consumption. The annuity has a positive payoff if and only if the consumer
survives, thereby having a positive marginal utility of
consumption; the annuity has a zero payoff if the consumer dies, in which case wealth has zero marginal
utility. Therefore, an actuarially fair increase in the level
of Social Security taxes and benefits will make a young
consumer wealthier and hence increase his consumption.

'5In a balanced budget pay-as-you-go system, GT=
(1 - p)S. In this case, equation (9) implies c(?) = aY+ b
+ a((G/((1 - p)R))-1)T so that the introduction of
Social Security causes c(?) to increase, decrease, or
remain unchanged according to whether G is greater
than, less than, or equal to (1- p) R. It follows from
equation (10) that the introduction of Social Security
causes W(?) to fall by (1- a)T+ aR-S.

(25) C* + C2* = Y+ ((R/G)-1)(W* + T).
Thus, aggregate private consumption is equal
to the sum of labor income Y and the net
return (adjusted for population growth) on
national wealth. Observe that if R = G, so
that the net rate of return on capital is equal
to the rate of population growth, then the
coefficient on national wealth in (25) is zero.

In this case, C* + C2* is independent of the
level of actuarially fair Social Security taxes
and benefits. Furthermore, in view of the
aggregate income expansion path in (19),

both C* and C2* are independent of the

level of actuarially fair Social Security taxes
and benefits when R = G. If R > G, then the
reduction in aggregate wealth, W* + T, induced by the introduction of Social Security,
leads to a reduction in C* + C2*; in light of

(19), C1* and C2* are each reduced by the
introduction of actuarially fair Social Secur-

ity. Finally, if R < G, then C1* and C2* are
each increased by the introduction of actu-

arially fair Social Security."6
16 Under a balanced budget pay-as-you-go system,
GT = (1 -p ) S, so that from (18) aggregate consumption is C * + C2* = Y+(R/G-1)W*. As shown in fn.
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B. The Intracohort Distributions of

actuarially fair Social Security reduces W",

Consumption and Wealth

it also reduces the (magnitude of the) de-

Having analyzed the effects of Social
Security on the aggregate consumption of the
young cohort and the aggregate consumption
of the old cohort, I now examine the intracohort distributions of consumption and
wealth. As already shown (equation (20)),
the first-period consumption of type-0 consumers increases by apR-1S in response to
the introduction of Social Security. Also I

consumption from the average first-period
consumption.'8 Thus, the distribution of
consumption is narrowed by the introduction
of Social Security. More precisely, all central
moments of the intracohort distribution of

viation of type-j consumer's first-period

CO) are reduced by the introduction of Social
Security.

have shown that W(?) falls by T+apR-'S

The effects of the introduction of Social
Security on second-period consumption are
easily calculated by observing from (8) that

when Social Security is introduced. As a

c(j) can be expressed as an increasing linear

consequence of the fall in WO), therefunction
is a
of c( ). Therefore, the narrowing of
reduction in bequests, B('), received atthe
birth
distribution of c(j) implies that the disby type-I consumers. Indeed, the introduc-

tribution of c(') is also narrowed by the
tion of Social Security reduces BO') for all
introduction of Social Security.
For the case in which R = G, it is
type-j consumers for j=1,2,3,.... This result follows from the facts that BO1) is pro-straightforward to analyze the (steady-state)
portional to W(?) (see equations (13) and
welfare implications of the introduction of
(14)) and that W(?) is reduced by the introSocial Security. In this case, the introduction

duction of Social Security. Below I analyze
the effects of the induced reduction in bequests in the intracohort distribution of consumption.
The deviation of a typej consumer's firstperiod consumption from the average level
of first-period consumption is proportional
to B(j) - B* (see equations (11) and (23)):

(26) cO) -Cl = a ( B() - B*).
Since BO') and B* are each proportional to
W(?), it follows that c(j)-C * is also proportional to W(0).17 Because the introduction of

of actuarially fair Social Security does not
affect the average levels of consumption of
the young or of the old as explained in
Section III, Part A. However, it narrows the
distribution of consumption of each cohort.
Therefore, if each consumer has an identical
utility function and receives equal weight in
the social welfare function, the introduction
of Social Security is welfare improving. If
R < G, then the introduction of Social Security raises the average level of consumption
and reduces the variance of consumption.

Each of these effects increases social welfare.
However, if R > G, then the introduction of
Social Security reduces average consumption, which tends to reduce welfare, but also
15, W(o) is reduced by the introduction of pay-as-you-go reduces the intracohort variance of consump-

tion, which tends to raise welfare.
Social Security. Therefore, since W* is proportional to
W(?), it follows that W* is also reduced. As in the text,
aggregate consumption is reduced, increased, or left unIV. The Transition Path to the New
changed according to whether R is greater than, less
Steady State
than, or equal to G.
17More formally, using equations (13), (14), (16), and
(17), equation (26) can be rewritten as

C'j)-C = la ( R/G) W(O)

x( (1-a)(R/) 1 - p (R /G)(1 - a))

The analysis in Section III of the effects of
the introduction of actuarially fair Social
Security was a comparative steady-state anal-

"8Recall from fn. 15 that W(0) is also reduced by
pay-as-you-go Social Security. Hence, pay-as-you-go Social Security also narrows the distribution of consump-

where -j- '(I - a)'(R/G)' is equal to zero fortion.
j = 0.
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ysis; it was assumed that the Social Security

beginning of period t* + m. Let A denote the

system had been in effect long enough

change in a variable induced by the intro-

so that essentially no one received a be-

duction of Social Security (relative to the

quest that included part of the savings of an

regime without Social Security). Thus, the

ancestor who lived in the initial regime
without Social Security. Equivalently, it was

effect of Social Security on the first-period

assumed that each person had at least one

time t* + m is obtained from (11) and (13) as

consumption of type-j consumers born at

ancestor who lived for two periods under the
new regime, leaving no bequests and thus
severing links to the old regime.

(27) AC (j) = Ac-() + a ( R /<G ) AW(i -l

In this section, I examine the transition
path to the new steady state, which accompanies the introduction of an actuarially fair

Social Security system. I show that the introduction of Social Security reduces the intracohort variances of first-period and second-period consumption for every genera-

j=1,2,3,...

m = 2,3,4,....
Equation (27) displays the two countervailing effects on the consumption of subsequent
generations. It follows immediately from (20)
that

tion (except the first) born under the new

Social Security regime. Also, if R < G, then
the average levels of first-period and secondperiod consumption of each generation are
at least as high under the Social Security
regime as in the absence of Social Security.
In this case, the introduction of Social Security increases the welfare of every generation
born under the Social Security regime.
Suppose that actuarially fair fully funded
Social Security is introduced at the beginning
of period t* + 1. It will be assumed that since
the older cohort (born at time t*) did
not contribute to the Social Security system,
they receive no benefits. The young genera-

(28) AcM =apR-1S>O.
Thus, as explained earlier, the first-period
consumption of type-0 consumers increases.
For consumers who receive positive bequests at birth, there is a second effect on
consumption and lifetime income because
these consumers receive smaller bequests as a
result of the introduction of Social Security.
A straightforward generalization of (14)
yields
J*~

(29) AW(j=l)=AW(?) E, (1-a)'(R/G)'
i=0

tion (born at time t* + 1) pays a tax T=

(1 - p )R - 1S and the survivors will each receive a Social Security payment of S as dis-

j =1,2,3,...

m 2,3,4,....

cussed in Section III. The bequests received
by each individual in the young generation
are invariant to the introduction of Social
Security, and for a given level of bequests
received at birth, the introduction of Social

where j* = min(j, m -1). Observe from (21)
that19

Security increases the present value of lifetime income by pR - 1S. Thus, every consumer in this generation increases first-period

(30) AW(0) (T+ apR-1S) < 0.

consumption by apR-'S, and every surviv-

A WA({ 7) < 0 so that type-j consumers born

or increases second-period consumption by
(1 -a )pS. This generation unanimously favors the introduction of actuarially fair Social Security.
Next I consider the effect of the introduction of Social Security on subsequent generations. Let the subscript m denote that a
variable pertains to a consumer born at the

at the beginning of period t* + m receive
smaller bequests at birth. The magnitude of
the reduction in bequests is strictly increas-

Since AW(?) < 0, it is clear from (29) that

ing in j*. Thus, for the generation born at

19Recall from fn. 15 that A W(t0 < 0 for pay-as-you-go
Social Security also.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:48:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

786 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC RE VIEW SEPTEMBER 1985

the beginning of period t* + m, the reduction

decreases as m increases. The reason is that

in bequests received by type-j consumers is

as m increases (i.e., as we increase the length

strictly increasing in j for j = 0,1 ..., m - 1,

of time for which the Social Security regime
has been in effect), there is a decrease in the

and is constant for j=m-1,m,m+1,....
This finding combined with the fact that the

level of bequests received by type-j consumers is strictly increasing in j for the
Social Security regime as well as the regime

without Social Security implies that the
introduction of Social Security reduces the
intracohort variance of bequests received by

all generations born after period t* + 1.20
Since first-period (second-period) consumption is a linear function of the bequest
received at birth, the introduction of Social
Security also reduces the intracohort variance of first-period (second-period) consumption for these generations.
I have derived unambiguous results about
the intracohort variance of consumption
along the transition path to the new steady
state. The effects on the average level of
consumption are less clear-cut. As already
shown, for the generation born at the beginning of period t* + 1, the average levels of
first-period and second-period consumption
are increased by the introduction of Social
Security. It has also been shown that, in the
new steady state, the average levels of c(j)
and c decrease, increase, or remain unchanged, depending on whether R is greater
than, less than, or equal to G. I show in the

amount of bequests which represent accumulated saving from generations born before
the introduction of Social Security, when
private saving was higher.

In the case in which R = G, equation (31)
implies that AC*m is equal to aR - lSpm
(1 - a)"1, which is positive for all finite m.
Thus, since the introduction of Social Security increases the average and reduces the

variance of c(') for all finite m, it also (see
equation (8)) increases the average value and
reduces the variance of c() for all finite m.
Therefore, if R = G, the introduction of So-

cial Security is welfare improving for every
generation born under the new Social Secur-

ity regime. More generally, if R < G, the
welfare of every generation (except the current old generation which is unaffected) is
improved by the introduction of Social
Security.
The welfare effects of the introduction of
Social Security are less clear-cut in the case
in which R > G. Clearly, the welfare of the

generation born at time t* +1 is improved

because, as explained earlier, the first-period
consumption of every consumer in this generation increases by apR - 1S (and from equation (8), second-period consumption increases by (1 - a)pS). For all generations
Appendix that ?AC*m, the change in the
born after time t* +1, the introduction of
average level of first-period consumption of
Social Security reduces the intracohort varithe generation born at time t* + m, is
ance of consumption. For sufficiently small
m, it follows from (31) that the average level
x 1-p(R/G)(1- a)
of first-period (and second-period) consumption is increased by the introduction of Social Security. Thus, for these generations,
x {1 -(R/G)+?[1- p( - a)I
welfare is increased. The difficulty in my
welfare analysis arises for generations born
x (RIG)mp m-1(I _-a)m-11.
long after the introduction of Social Security.
If R > G, then it follows from (31) that for
Since it has been assumed that (1- a)pR is
sufficiently large m, the average first-period
(and a fortiori average second-period) conless than G, it is clear from (31) that AC1*m
sumption of the generation born at time
t * + m is reduced by the introduction of
Social Security. The effect on the welfare of
2()This statement is simply an application of the factthis generation thus depends on whether the
that if x( j) and y(j) are strictly increasing in j, and if
welfare-improving effects of reduced variy( j) - x(j) is nonincreasing in j and strictly decreasing
ance dominate the welfare-worsening effects
for some j, then the variance y(j) is less than the
variance of x(j).
of reduced average consumption.

(31) C*m = -1 apR -1
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V. Private Annuities

In previous sections in this paper, it was
assumed that there is no private market for
annuities, and I showed that the introduction
of actuarially fair Social Security reduces the
national capital stock. However, if there were
a competitive market for annuities, then the
introduction of Social Security would have
no effect because the competitively supplied
actuarially fair annuities would be perfect
substitutes for actuarially fair Social Security; hence, consumers could completely offset
the effects of Social Security by conducting
transactions in the private annuity market.
Since the introduction of actuarially fair Social Security reduces the steady-state capital
stock, it is natural to ask whether the introduction of a competitive annuity market also
reduces the steady-state capital stock. In this
section, we analyze a simple example to show
that the introduction of a market for private
annuities can either increase or decrease the
steady-state capital stock.2'
With the introduction of private annuities,
there are now two alternative forms in which
a consumer can hold his wealth. As before,
he can hold capital directly, earning a gross
rate of return R. Alternatively, he can deposit his savings at an annuity company. The
annuity company operates by accepting deposits from young consumers and using these
deposits to buy capital which earns a gross
rate of return R. At the beginning of the
following period, the annuity company distributes its holdings (with accumulated interest) to its surviving depositors in proportion
to their initial deposits. Thus, each surviving
depositor at the annuity company receives

A = R /(1 - p) dollars for each dollar initially deposited. As shown by Yaari, consumers who do not have explicit bequest
motives will choose to hold all of their wealth
in the form of these annuities. Thus, there
will be no bequests.
Consumers can, by holding annuities, earn
a gross rate of return A on their savings so
that c2 = A[Y - cl]. The maximization prob-

lem of the representative consumer22 is

(32) Max U(cl)+ (l-p) SU(A(Y- cl)).
Ci

The first-order condition for this problem is

(33) U'(cl) = (1- p)A 3U'(C2)With actuarially fair annuities (1- p)A = R,
so that the first-order condition (33) can be
written as

(34) U'(cl ) = R 8U (C2
where a circumflex denotes the value of a
variable in the presence of a private annuity
market.
For the remainder of this section we assume that R = 8 = 1, that is, that the net rate
of return on capital and the rate of time
preference are each equal to zero. With RS
= 1, (34) implies that c = c for any strictly

concave utility function U( ). Since C2 =
A(Y- c) and A = (1- p), we obtain cl =

c2= (1/(2- p))Y. Therefore, since W= Ycl, we obtain

(35) 'W = ((I - p )/(2 - p )) Y.
Now consider the economy without an
annuity market. For the remainder of this
section, it will be assumed that U(c) exhibits
constant relative risk aversion. Recall from
Section I that with R = 8 = 1, and a constant
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to
a, the marginal (and average) propensity

to consume is a=[1+(1_p)1/1]l1. Thus,
the first-period consumption of type-O consumers is

(3) 10 Y/(' + (I1-p )
It is straightforward to show that

(37) c > c(?) as a> 1.

22 Since there are no bequests, there is no need to
distinguish consumers according to the mortality history

21See Kotlikoff, John Shoven, and of
Spivak
(1983)
their families.
Also, for
since actuarially fair Social Securan analysis of the effects of various annuity arrange-

ity has no effect in the presence of an annuity market, I

ments on capital accumulation.

simply set S= T= 0.
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The intuition for this result is that the intro-

duction of a private annuity market raises
the rate of return on private savings from R
to R /(1 - p). The income effect of this
change is to raise first-period consumption
whereas the substitution effect is to reduce
first-period consumption. With a > 1, the income effect dominates and with a <1, the
substitution effect dominates. For logarithmic utility, (a =1), the income and substitution effects exactly offset each other. By contrast, notice that although Social Security has
the payoff characteristics of an annuity, the
introduction of actuarially fair Social Security has a positive income effect but has no
substitution effect because individual consumers cannot choose the level of savings to
be held in the form of Social Security.
The analysis in the above paragraph examines the effect on type-0 consumers of the
introduction of an annuity market. For type-j

consumers, there is an additional effect, because these consumers receive bequests in the
absence of private annuities but do not receive bequests in the presence of annuities.
To calculate the effect of an annuity market
on the long-run capital stock, observe from
(10) and (17) that in the absence of annu-

ities, and with R = 8 = 1, the steady-state
capital stock is

(38) W* =Y[+1p -pIG]
Comparing (35) and (38) it can be shown
that

(39) W> W* as a >a

elimination of bequests received by type-j

consumers for j11 also tends to reduce
private wealth.23 On the other hand, when
a <1, the introduction of private annuities
reduce the first-period consumption and increases the saving of type-0 consumers.
Whether this wealth-increasing effect dominates the wealth-reducing effect of eliminating bequests depends on whether a is
less than a.
VI. Concluding Remarks

I have developed a general equilibrium
model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests that is sufficiently rich to produce endogenous distributions of consumption, wealth, and bequests. The model is
based on individual utility-maximizing behavior and yields decision rules for consumers that are linear and easily aggregated.
After developing the model in Sections I and
II, it was shown in Section III that, in the
absence of a private annuity market, the
introduction of actuarially fair Social Security crowds out private wealth by more than
one for one, thereby reducing national
wealth; in addition, it reduces all central
moments of the distributions of consumption, wealth, and bequests. Section IV
analyzes the transition path to the new steady
state when Social Security is introduced. The
immediate effect is for the average level of
consumption by young consumers to increase and for the variance of their consumption to remain unchanged. However, both
the mean and the variance of consumption
by young consumers decreases continually as

where

a=[_ln(l+((I p)p /G))]<1

U ~~~ln(I1-p) <1

According to (39), there is a critical value
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion that
determines whether the long-run capital stock
increases or decreases when a private annuity
market is introduced. When a > 1, the introduction of an annuity market raises firstperiod consumption of type-0 consumers and
thus reduces their saving. In addition, the

23 Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak examine a more
complex overlapping-generations model with uncertain
lifetimes. They solve their model numerically, and in

each of their numerical simulations, they assume that
the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater
than one. Although they find that the introduction of a

perfect annuity market reduces long-run aggregate
wealth in each of their similations, the results in (39)
suggest caution in applying this result to consumers with
a coefficient of relative risk aversion sufficiently below
one. Of course, since their model differs somewhat from

the model presented herein, the critical value of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, if one exists, would
probably differ from that in (39).
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each subsequent generation is born. In Section V, I switched attention from publicly
provided annuities to privately traded annuities and showed that the introduction of a

private annuity market would cause the
steady-state capital stock to increase or decrease depending on the risk aversion of
consumers.

The model presented in this paper was
purposely designed to allow a simple examination of precautionary saving and acci-

dental bequests in a general equilibrium
framework. Toward this end, the following
simplifying assumptions were made: 1) consumers live for either one or two periods; 2)

the rate of return on capital, R, is constant;

3) there is no private market for annuities
(except in Section V); and 4) consumers are

selfish, that is, they have no bequest motive.
An implication of assumption 1 and the
assumption that consumers give birth to their
children at the end of the first period of life
is that each consumer knows at birth exactly
what bequest he will receive from his parent.
If consumers lived potentially for many periods so that a parent's lifetime uncertainty
were not resolved when the child is born,
then we would have the additional problem
of calculating optimal consumption behavior
when there is the prospect of receiving a
bequest of uncertain size at an unknown date
in the future. Edi Karni and Itzhak Zilcha
(1984) have examined the case in which consumers live for three periods. They prove the
existence of the steady-state equilibrium in
the absence of annuity and insurance markets, and demonstrate that the introduction
of competitive life insurance and annuity
markets leads to a Pareto optimal steady-state
equilibrium. However, they do not provide
closed-form solutions for consumption. Also,
their model cannot be used to examine longrun capital accumulation since capital is absent from their model. Kotlikoff, Shoven,
and Spivak also relax assumption 1, but provide numerical rather analytic solutions of
their model.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are both relaxed by
Glenn Hubbard (1984). In place of the linear
technology assumed above, Hubbard introduces a neoclassical production function into
a model with uncertain lifetimes. However,

he assumes that the government confiscates
the assets held by consumers when they die
and then redistributes the assets in lump sum
fashion. This assumption circumvents the
technical difficulty mentioned above but this
simplification also eliminates the intracohort
variations in consumption and wealth. Hubbard does not solve his model analytically
and resorts to numerical simulation to study
the effects of Social Security.
Assumption 3 is crucial in order for Social
Security to have an effect in this model. If
there were a competitive annuity market, the
rate of return on competitively supplied annuities would be equal to the implicit rate of
return offered by Social Security. In this case
consumers could undo the effects of Social
Security by conducting offsetting transactions in the private annuity market. However, if the probability of dying after one
period of life differed across consumers, then
Social Security would have an effect on behavior. In another paper (1984a), I assume
that an individual's probability of an early
death is private information known only by
the individual, so that the private annuity
market is subject to adverse selection. However, a compulsory Social Security system is
immune to adverse selection and can offer a
higher rate of return than the equilibrium
rate of return in the private annuity market.
Thus, consumers cannot effectively undo the
effects of Social Security by transacting in
the private annuity market because private
and social annuities are no longer perfect
substitutes.
Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1985b)
also use the insight that the Social Security
system is immune to adverse selection. They
assume that consumers have no bequest motive so that with a private annuity market,

there are no bequests, accidental or otherwise. However, in my 1984a paper, I relax
assumption 4 and specify the utility function
to have a bequest motive. I then show that
the introduction of Social Security can either
increase or decrease the steady-state capital
stock depending on the strength of the bequest motive. In my 1984b paper, I assume

that the probability of an early death differs
across consumers, but these probabilities are
public information. In this case, the intro-

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:48:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

790 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1985

duction of actuarially fair Social Security will
have an effect if the government chooses not
to discriminate on the basis of the probability of dying.
Although I have made some progress in
incorporating a bequest motive into an overlapping generations model with uncertain
lifetimes, further research is needed. My oth-

er papers (1984a, b) used the Hakansson,
Fischer, and Scott Richard (1975) utility
function which specifies a consumer's utility
as a function of his own consumption and of
the size of the bequest he leaves. An alternative formulation is based on Barro's inter-

generational altruism in which a consumer
derives utility from his own consumption
and from the utility of his heirs. This formulation effectively converts the individual consumer' s decision problem into an infinite
horizon problem. In future research I plan to
study the role for fiscal policy in an overlapping generations economy populated by consumers with uncertain lifetimes and altruistic
bequest motives.

As a step toward calculating the average
value of each side of (A3), I first calculate
00

j*-l

(A4) (I (-P)pj E xi
j

j

i=O

Recalling that j* = min(j, m - 1), (A4) can
be rearranged to yield
00

j*-1

(A5) E (1-p P)pj E xi
j=O

i=O

[ pjxi
m-1
= - 1Ij1j- E00
p jxmCalculating the sums on the right-hand side
of (A5) yields
00

j*-1

(A6) F (1- p)pj E xi
j=O

APPENDIX

i=O

= _ _____

1-p I1-pi xm-i 1-PMXM 1

Here I derive equation (31) in the text
which shows the effect on Ci*m of the introduction in period t* +1 of actuarially fair
Social Security.
It will be useful to define x as

which can be
simplified
to yield
l-x
l-p
l-x
00

j*-l

(A7) E (1-p) pi E xi

(Al) x-(1-a)(R/G).

j

Under actuarially fair Social Security, RT=
(1-p)S so that

=

0

=

i=O

(

p/(l

-

Now calculate the average value of each side
of (A3) and use (A7) to obtain

(A2) (R/G)(T?apR-1S)
- (R/G)(1-p + ap)R -S

(A8) L\CI*m=apR-S - (R/G) -px

= ((R/G)-px)R-1S.
X (1- pm-iXm )}

Substituting (28)-(30) into (27) and using
(Al) and (A2), we obtain
Rearranging (A8) yields
(A3) AC(J)

{

px)

~~~~j*-l

=aR-'S P-[(R/G)-pxI E xj
i = 0

(A9) ACm = apR1-P {1-(R/G)
+ [(R/G)- px] pm-lxm-l}
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tional Economic Review, October 1969, 10,

Recognizing that

(AIO) [(RIG)-px]pn p- Ixm-1
= [1-p(l-a)]Ipm (I-a)m " (R/G)
then yields equation (31) in the text.
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